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ABSTRACT

The predominant view of the binding facts of the Japanese reflexive "zibun" is that there are two types of uses; one is as a reflexive that is to be bound by the clause-mate subject, and the other is as the so-called "logophoric" pronoun. Accordingly, the binding theory of "zibun" along the lines of this view will take the form of disjunction: "zibun" is bound by a Noun Phrase (NP) if the NP is the clause-mate subject or it is a logophoric NP. In this paper, a conceptually more unified theory is proposed that suggests every instance of "zibun" should be bound by a point of view, and it is demonstrated that such a view is superior to the disjunctive view empirically as well as conceptually. Contains 14 references. (JL)

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POINT OF VIEW AND *ZIBUN:* Toward a Unified Theory of the Japanese Reflexive

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Abstract: The predominant view of the binding facts of the Japanese reflexive *zibun* is that there are two types of uses; one is as a reflexive which is to be bound by the clause-mate subject, and the other one is as the so-called "logophoric" pronoun. Accordingly, the binding theory of *zibun* along the lines of this view will take the form of disjunction: *zibun* is bound by an NP if the NP is the clause-mate subject or it is a logophoric NP. However, it is hard to accept the idea of a morpheme one use of which is governed by a purely syntactic property, subjecthood, and the other one of which is governed by a purely semantic/pragmatic property, logophoricity. Such an analysis seems to fail to reach the appropriate level of generalization about the binding facts of *zibun*. In the current paper, we propose a conceptually more unfied view that every instance of *zibun* should be bound by a point of view, and demonstrate that such a view is superior to the above disjunctive view empirically as well as conceptually.*

Introduction

Many researchers have proposed the binding conditions of the Japanese reflexive *zibun* on purely syntactic grounds by analogy to the so-called Condition A for the English reflexives in GB. The common denominator of the purely syntactic analyses of the *zibun* binding is roughly: The antecedent of *zibun* must be a subject noun phrase, it need not be in the same clause as *zibun*, and the referent of the antecedent must be animate. However, there is a class of counterexamples to the subjecthood condition on the antecedent. The counterexamples are characteristically such that the antecedent is not a subject, and furthermore, is not in the same clause as the *zibun*; that is, they are non-clause-bounded cases of the *zibun*-binding. To accommodate those counterexamples, several authors, e.g., Kuno (1987), Kameyama (1984, 5), Iida and Sells (1988), and Sells (1987), have proposed that those counterexamples should be analyzed as the cases of the so-called "logophoric" binding. Those approaches naturally lead to the bifurcation of the conditions governing the distributions of the morpheme *zibun*; one use, which is realized as the clause-bounded anaphora case, is such that the antecedent is the subject of the same clause, and the other use, which is realized as the non-clause-bounded anaphora case, is such that the antecedent is a "logophoric" one. As a matter of fact, Kameyama (1984), for instance, proposed that *zibun* should be bound with a [+ logophoric] element or a subject noun phrase. However, at least in my opinion, they are missing a conceptual unity, for it is conceptually puzzling for two tokens of the same morpheme to be governed separately by such disparate conditions as a purely syntactic property, i.e., subjecthood, and a purely semantic/pragmatic/discourse property, i.e., logophoricity.

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In this paper we will examine the notion of *point of view*, and propose a unified analysis of *zibun*-binding, in which all the occurrences of the *zibun* are to be identified with the referent of a point of view. In the proposed analysis, the subjecthood condition on the antecedent in the clause-bounded case of *zibun*-binding will be shown to follow as a consequence from a default principle that the locus of the point of view in event/state descriptions coincides with the referent of the subject phrase.

Syntactically Based Analyses of *Zibun*-binding

In the presence of the following kind of stock data on *zibun*-binding, it is natural, and in a sense, historically inevitable, considering the development of Condition A for English reflexives in GB (Chomsky (1981)) that numerous proposals, some of which we will review in Section 3 have been made all of which are essentially saying that *zibun* is to be bound by a subject of the same clause or a higher one.

(1) a. Ken$_i$ ga zibun$_i$ wo seme-ta
Ken NOM self ACC blame-PAST
'Ken blamed himself.'

b. Zibun$_i$ wo Ken$_i$ ga seme-ta
self ACC Ken NOM blame-PAST
'Ken blamed himself.'

c. *Zibun$_i$ ga Ken$_i$ wo seme-ta
self NOM Ken ACC blame-PAST
'Ken blamed himself.'

d. *Ken$_i$ wo zibun$_i$ ga seme-ta
Ken ACC self NOM blame-PAST
'Ken blamed himself.'

(2) [Hanako$_i$ wa [Taroo$_j$ ga zibun$_{i/j}$ wo aishiteiru]] to omotteiru
Hanako TOP Taroo NOM self ACC love COMP think
'Hanako$_i$ thinks that Taro$_j$ loves her$_i$/himself$_j$.'

(2) demonstrates that the antecedent need not be in the same clause as *zibun*.

(3) Taroo$_i$ wa Hanako$_j$ ni zibun$_{i/j}$ wo seme-sase-ta
Taroo TOP Hanako DAT self ACC blame-CAUSE-PAST
'Taroo$_i$ made Hanako$_j$ blame him$_i$/herself$_j$.'

(3) shows that it is subjecthood, not *ga*-marking, or nominative-marking that counts as an condition on the antecedent of *zibun*, for *Hanako*, which is an antecedent of *zibun* is a subject in the subordinate clause.

(4)

a. Taroo$_i$ ga Hanako$_j$ wo zibun$_{i/*j}$ no apaato de korosita.
Taroo NOM Hanako ACC self POSS apartment LOC killed
'Taroo$_i$ killed Hanako$_j$ at self$_{i/*j}$'s apartment.'

b. Hanako$_i$ ga Taroo$_j$ ni zibun$_{i/*j}$ no apaato de korosareta.
Hanako NOM Taroo LOC self POSS apartment LOC was killed
'Hanako$_i$ was killed by Taroo$_j$ at self$_{i/*j}$'s apartment.'

The binding facts exhibited in (4) indicate that it is a grammatical role, i.e., subjecthood rather than a thematic role, i.e., agent or theme, that is relevant for being an antecedent for *zibun*, since what is common to the possible antecedents, *Taroo* and *Hanako* in (4a) and (4b) is being subject, while they are distinct in terms of thematic roles.

Logophoric Binding of *Zibun*

Counterexamples to the Syntactically Based Approaches to the *Zibun*-Binding

However supportive to the syntactic based approaches the above data may be, it is easy to find counterexamples to the subjecthood condition on the antecedent of *zibun*. Consider the following examples, where the relevant anaphors are the ones coindexed with *j*.

(5)

a. Taroo$_i$ wa Hanako$_j$ ni [zibun$_{i/j}$ ga sono tegami wo kaita]
Taroo TOP Hanako by self NOM the letter ACC wrote

to iwa-re-ta.
Comp was told
'Taroo$_i$ was told by Hanako$_j$ that self$_{i/j}$ had written the letter.'

b. Taroo$_i$ wa Hanako$_j$ ni [zibun$_{i/j}$ wo aisiteiru betuno otoko ga
Taroo TOP Hanako by self ACC loves another man NOM

iru] to tuge-rare-ta.
exists Comp was informed

'Taroo$_i$ was informed by Hanako$_j$ that there was another man who loves self$_{i/j}$.'

(6)

a. Taroo$_i$ wa Hanako$_j$ kara [zibun$_{i/j}$ ga nihon e iku koto ni natta]
Taroo TOP Hanako from self Nom Japan to go Comp became

to kiita.
Comp heard

'Taroo$_i$ heard from Hanako$_j$ that it had been decided that self$_{i/j}$ would go to Japan.'

b. Taroo$_i$ wa Hanako$_j$ kara [zibun$_{i/j}$ no tokoro ni Tokyoo
Taroo TOP Hanako from self Poss place Loc Tokyo

kara no okyaku ga kuru] to kiita.
from GEN guest Nom come Comp heard

'Taroo$_i$ heard from Hanako$_j$ that a visitor from Tokyo would come to self$_{i/j}$'s place.'

McCawley (1976) noted that the object of a psychological verb can be the antecedent of *zibun* inside a complement clause, e.g., as in (7).

(7)

a. [Taroo$_i$ ga zibun$_{i/j}$ wo aisiteiru] koto ga Hanako$_j$ wo
Taroo NOM self ACC loves Comp NOM Hanako ACC

siawasena kibun ni sita.
happy feeling DAT did

The fact that Taroo$_i$ loves self$_{i/j}$ made Hanako$_j$ feel happy.'

b. [Zibun$_j$ ga ikaiyoo dearu kamosirenai] toiu kenen ga
self NOM ulcer is it is possible Comp suspicion NOM

Yooko$_j$ wo fuan ni sita.
Yoko ACC worry DAT did

'The suspicion$_j$ that self might have an ulcer made Yoko$_j$ worry.'

Logophoricity What is common to the above examples, where it is possible for *zibun* to be bound with a non-subject antecedent? All of the examples are complex sentences, having a clausal or sentential complement as an argument. According to

Kameyama (1984) and Kuno (1987), those clausal complements are furthermore "logophoric" ones.

Kameyama adopted the notion of logophoricity as it was originally introduced to account for the distributional facts of a class of pronouns morphologically different from other pronouns, which, of course, were referred to as "logophoric" pronouns. Let us see some examples from Ewe, reported in Clements (1975). The "logophoric" pronoun in Ewe is *yè*(plural *yèwo*), as cited in the following examples.

(8)

a. kofi be yè-dzo
Kofi say Log-leave
'Kofi$_j$ said that he$_j$ left.'

b. kofi be e-dzo
Kofi say Pro-leave
'Kofi$_j$ said that he$_i$ left.'

(9) ana kpO dyidzo be yè-dyi vi
Ana see happiness Comp Log-bear child
'Ana$_i$ was happy that she$_i$ bore a child.'

(10)

a. kofi nya be me-kpO yè
Kofi know Comp Pro-see Log
'Kofi$_j$ knew that I had seen him$_j$.'

b. kofi me-nya be me-kpO yè
Kofi not-know Comp Pro-see Log
'Kofi$_j$ didn't know that I had seen him$_j$.'

In terms of Clements (1975), the antecedent of the logophoric pronoun must be "the individual (other than the speaker) whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or general state of consciousness are reported or reflected in the linguistic context in which the pronoun occurs" [Clements (1975: 141)]. Kameyama claimed that the examples from (5) to (7) are cases of the logophoric binding of *zibun*, characterizing those non-subject binders as referring to the individuals who inform or report certain information or whose feelings are described.

Kuno (1987) adopted the notion of logophoricity from the study of reflexive pronouns in indirect discourse clauses. For example, in Latin, a (third person) reflexive pronoun *se* (accusative and ablative form) can or must appear in a subordinate clause with its antecedent outside the subordinate clause in some constructions:

(11) [Kuno 1987: (2.1), p. 105]

Petierunt	ut	*sibi*	liceret
begged	so-that	to-self	be-allowed

'They$_i$ begged that it might be allowed them$_i$.

(12) [Kuno 1987: (2.2), p. 105]

Icciusj	nuntium	mittit,	nisi	subsidium	*sibij*	submittatur . . .
	message	send	unless	support	to-self	is-furnished

'Icciusj sends a message that unless relief be furnished himj, . . .'

Kuno cited the condition characterizing the use of reflexive pronoun in question, which he would call the "logophoric" pronoun, from Allen and Greenough (1883/1903, p. 181):

> If the subordinate clause expresses the words or thought of the subject of the main clause, the reflexive is regularly used to refer to the subject . . . Sometimes the person or thing to which the reflexive refers is not the grammatical subject of the main clause, though it is in effect the subject of the discourse. . . If the subordinate clause does not express the words or thought of the main subject, the reflexive is not regularly used, though it is occasionally found.

The above characterization of logophoricity, specifically, that of "logophoric" pronoun, complement clause, and antecedent NP, roughly coincides with what Kameyama cited above from Clements (1975) conceptually. Besides the above definition, Kuno provides us with a more syntactic perspective on logophoricity. For him, the essential nature of logophoricity pertains to the speaker and the hearer of direct discourse statements. From this characterization of logophoricity it follows that for a complement clause to be a "logophoric" complement clause it is necessary for there to be a corresponding direct discourse statement for the complement clause. To illustrate his notion of logophoricity and its utility, let us consider the following data from Kuno [1987: (2.3) and (2.4), respectively, p. 105], which are about the distribution of full NP (nonpronominal and nonreflexive):

(13)

a. Those who trusted John$_i$ were betrayed by him$_i$ repeatedly.

b. Those who trusted him$_i$ were betrayed by John$_i$ repeatedly.

In (13), the presence or absence of a full NP, in this case, *John* in a subordinate clause, does not make a difference in grammaticality, while it does in (14).

(14)

a. ??That Ali$_j$ was the best boxer in the world was claimed by him$_j$.

b. (?)That he$_j$ was the best boxer in the world was claimed by Ali$_j$.

The difference between the subordinate clause in (13) and that in (14) is that the former cannot be taken to be an indirect discourse representation for any direct discourse statement which Ali could have said, while the latter is readily interpretable as an indirect discourse representation of what Ali said, which is something like:

(15) "I am the best boxer in the world."[1]

For Kuno, it is the speaker/experiencer and the hearer of the direct speech representation corresponding to an indirect speech complement clause that constitutes a defining character of logophoricity. The effects of logophoricity on linguistic forms are mediated by marking relevant NP arguments of direct discourse verbs with respect to whether they represent the speaker/experiencer or the hearer of the direct discourse representations corresponding to the complement clauses. He uses the symbol [+ logo-1] to mark the speaker/experiencer NP, which corresponds to the first person pronoun in the direct discourse representations, and the symbol [+ logo-2] to mark the addressee NP, which corresponds to the second person pronoun in the direct discourse representations. Then, the "logophoric" verbs are specified as verbs that take such NPs. The subject NP of verbs such as *say*, *tell*, *ask*, *complain*, *scream*, *realize*, *feel*, *know*, *expect* are as [+logo-1], and so are the object NPs of the so-called psychological NPs. The dative object of verbs such as *say*, *tell*, *ask*, *complain*, *scream* are marked with [+logo-2].

Going back to the examples in (13) and (14), Kuno proposed the following rule to account for the grammatical facts there:

(16) [Kuno 1987: (2.25), p.109]

> *Logophoric Pronoun Rule* (Revised): Given a verb that takes [+logo-1/2] NPs and a logophoric complement clause, a full (nonpronominal, nonreflexive) NP in that complement cannot be coindexed with the [+logo-1/2] NPs in the main clause.

Since *betray* is not a logophoric verb, (13a) and (13b) are not subject to (16), but since *claim* is a logophoric verb, (14a) is a violation of (16) with a full NP, *Ali* in a

logophoric complement being coindexed with a [+logo-1] NP, while (14b) does not violate (16).

To the extent that there are grammatical facts like the ones displayed by (13) and (14) that cannot be accounted for on purely syntactic grounds, which Kuno convincingly demonstrated in Chapter 3 of his book, it is safe to conclude that logophoricity in the above sense plays a significant role in natural language grammar.

Zibun as a "logophoric" pronoun: Even though Kuno maintained his position that the primary function of *zibun* is for clause-mate reflexivization, he acknowledged that there is a use of *zibun* as a logophoric pronoun, based on the following kind of data.

(17) [Kuno 1987: (14.10), p. 138]

a. Taroo$_i$ wa zibun$_i$ ga tensai da to omotte iru.
refl. genius is that thinking is
'Taroo thinks that he is a genius.'

b. ??Taroo$_i$ wa kare$_i$ ga tensai da to omotte iru.
he genius is that thinking is
'Taroo thinks that he is a genius.'

As Kuno suggested, it seems reasonable to account for the grammaticality contrast by assuming that *zibun*, or at least one use of *zibun* is a [+logo-1] pronoun; *zibun* is required to refer back to a [+logo-1] NP, in this case, *Taroo* , at least from the subject position in a logophoric complement.

Representative Existent Analyses of the *Zibun*-binding

In the above we have observed that the consensus about the current state of affairs of the *zibun*-binding analyses is that there are, in fact, some instances of *zibun* whose binding facts cannot be accounted for by the intraclausal subject binding, as was evidenced by the data in the preceding sections. Those counterexamples to the clause-bounded subject binding analysis of *zibun* have been analyzed as the cases of the "logophoric" binding, which we have reviewed in the preceding section. Here let us summarize some representative analyses of *zibun*; Kuno (1987), Kameyama (1984), and Iida and Sells (1988).

Kuno (1987) Kuno maintains the position that the primary function of *zibun* is a reflexive which is to be bound by the clause-mate subject NP, but acknowledged that *zibun* is sometimes used as a "logophoric" pronoun, as is *se* in Latin. In addition to the regular reflexive and the "logophoric" uses, he recognizes at least one more use of *zibun*, which is as what he calls an "empathy" pronoun. An "empathy" pronoun is a pronoun whose referent is to be identified with the "viewpoint" of the speaker in describing an event/state. We will review the notion

of "empathy," or more generally, *point of view*, and its linguistic relevance including the area of anaphoricity in Section 4.

Kameyama (1984) In the presence of non-subject-bound *zibun* instances like (5), (6), and (7), Kameyama proposed a disjunctive rule for the *zibun*-binding, i.e., *zibun* should be bound by a subject NP or a "logophoric" NP. However, she has a proviso about the subject-bound *zibun* that it is a point-of-view sensitive expression; thus, it is subject to conditions regarding to point of view. In fact, there are cases where a point-of-view sensitive *zibun* cannot be bound by a potential NP even though the NP is a subject. That means that the subjecthood condition is not a sufficient condition, but a necessary condition for the antecedent NP of *zibun* as a point-of-view sensitive expression. But, later in Section 5.1, we will see some example sentences where the point-of-view sensitive *zibun* is bound by a non-subject antecedent, which means that the subjecthood is not even a necessary condition for the antecedent of the point-of-view sensitive *zibun*. In fact, in this paper, we will demonstrate that *zibun* in general does not impose any syntactic structural conditions on its antecedent.

Iida and Sells (1988) Iida and Sells do not concern themselves with the use of *zibun* as a clause-bounded reflexive, which I assume they are content to treat as being subject to purely syntactic conditions. They agree with Kameyama and Kuno that the non-clause-bounded cases of *zibun*-binding are essentially different from the former ones in that their distributional facts are constrained by non-syntactic conditions, and like Kameyama and Kuno they call those instances of *zibun* "logophoric" pronouns. The analyses of the logophoric binding by Kameyama (1984) and Kuno (1987) are essentially syntactic in that the central mechanism of their analyses is the assignment of a feature [+log] or [+logo-1] to argument NPs in specified constructions, and it all takes place in syntactic representation, even though the crucial idea they are based on, i.e., logophoricity, is a non-syntactic notion. On the other hand, Iida and Sells embed their account of "logophoric" binding in a formal semantic framework, specifically, Discourse Representation Theory first developed by Kamp (1981) to give some content to the features, [+log] and [+logo-1]. In that account, they argue that logophoricity phenomena are better analyzed if we assume that there are at least three components or discourse roles to logophoricity: the SOURCE, the SELF, and the PIVOT. "The SOURCE is the one who makes the report (for example, the speaker). The SELF represents the one whose "mind" is being reported; the PIVOT represents the one from whose point of view the report is made" [Sells (1987): p. 455]. In that context, they propose that the *zibun* must be bound with a PIVOT. We will examine their proposal in more detail later. What is to be noted of Iida and Sells' account of logophoricity with respect to the following discussion in this paper is the introduction of the notion of point of view into the picture of logophoricity, as is evident from their definition of PIVOT.

What seems to be wrong (at least to me) with their analyses is that it is conceptually difficult to accept that there would be a morpheme whose uses are subject to conditions so disparate from each other as a purely syntactic and a purely non-syntactic one. In general, it is preferable that there is a unique rule/principle/condition governing a given morpheme, and their seemingly disparate uses of the morpheme will be derived from the unique/rule/condition in conjunction with some other factors. I suspect that the theories of Kuno and Kameyama could

be descriptively adequate, but not quite explanatorily adequate, missing the core principle of the *zibun* binding, whatever it is.

In the following we will examine the notion of point of view first without considering its linguistic implications, and see the prominence of the notion in our recognition of the world as cognitive agents. Next, we will attend to the linguistic relevancy of the notion of point of view by looking at some of what have been called point-of-view sensitive expressions. Then we will motivate the hypothesis that *zibun* is also a point-of-view sensitive expression. Our analysis will be different from the mentioned existent analyses in that it claims that all the instances of *zibun* can be analyzed as a point-of-view sensitive expression; thus, a unified analysis.

Point of View

Being finite entities, we human beings cannot be omnipresent or omniscient. That fact is, in a sense, an important reason for the existence of natural languages. If we were gods, we would know everything about the world; that is, there would be no need to communicate among ourselves, and consequently, there would not arise the need for languages either, given that the primary and foremost function of languages is communication. To put the truism of languages aside, we would like to speculate the implications of our being finite entities to humans as intelligent agents.

Being a finite entity, i.e., being situated in terms of space and time, implies that as an intelligent agent we can only recognize the world from a certain vantage point. Let us call this the *point of view*. For example, let us consider a locational state involving a cube and a pyramid depicted by figure (18)

(18)



One can describe the state as "The cube is on the right of the pyramid", while another can recognize the same state as "The cube is NOT on the right of the pyramid." According to a logic axiom, the so-called excluded middle, a reasonable

rendition in First Order Logic Language of the above description of the state, i.e., (19) is a contradiction.

(19) right-of(c, p) œ —right-of(c, p).

However, we know that the above description of the state in question is perfectly possible.

This seems to be paradoxical. Does this mean that the logic system, specifically, the excluded middle is wrong? The answer is No. The fallacy is due to the fact that the predicate expression in (18), *right-of* is a two-place one; however, the relation involved in the state (Let us denote it RIGHT-OF) is actually a three-place relation, taking three arguments. Two of the three arguments in the current situations are obviously the cube and the pyramid. Then what is a third argument? When you talk about the locational properties or relations of object(s) you usually need to determine an orientation along which the properties or relations are described.

Now it has become obvious that the RIGHT-OF relation is a three-place relation; two of the arguments are objects whose locations are characterized with respect to each other, and a third argument is a point of view, from which the objects are perceived. This, of course, has a bearing on the choice of the predicate which is involved in the logical formula to represent the above characterization of the state. It should be a three-place predicate instead of a two-place one. Let us denote the three-place predicate as right-of(-seen-from). Then the logical formula should be something like the following.

(20) right-of(c, p, a_1) œ —right-of(c, p, a_2),

where the first conjunct is the characterization of the spatial state (18) seen from an agent who is on the reader's side of this paper, while the second conjunct is the one by an agent who is behind this paper.

In the above we saw that an agent can perceive the world, specifically, eventualities only from a certain vantage point/camera angle/point of view. In the above example, the locus of the agent's point of view was on himself or herself. It is reasonable to assume that the point of view of an agent is typically the agent himself or herself. It is after all the agent himself or herself who conceives the world, so the agent himself or herself should be a default point of view.

Linguistic Relevance of Point of View Nonetheless, it is possible for an agent to take another as his or her point of view. For example, we can say something like "The cube is on left of the pyramid, seen from Bill's point of view", and "John is turning right at the corner." The last example is a case where the point of view of an agent is a participant involved in an event described, namely John. Let us consider another example. The type of event to be described is an event of someone's movement, say Taroo's movement toward another person, Hanako, as the destination. As is known from the fact that many languages including Japanese and English have two predicates to describe the type of movement-event mentioned

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above, *iku* 'go' and *kuru* 'come', there are two modes of describing the event depending on which participant you adopt as your point of view. The following two Japanese sentences corresponds to the two ways of describing the event.

(21) Taroo wa Hanako no tokoro ni itta[2].
Taroo TOP Hanako of place LOC went
'Taroo went to Hanako.'

(22) Taroo wa Hanako no tokoro ni kita[3].
Taroo TOP Hanako of place LOC came
'Taroo came to Hanako.'

In (21) the event is described with the speaker's point of view being Taroo, while in (22), the point of view is from Hanako. In general, given a movement event by one person to another, when an agent recognizes it as a going-event (a coming event), he or she takes on the source (the destination) of the movement as his or her point of view.

We saw that given an event an agent describing the event can take on some participant in the event as his or her point of view. Then what if the agent himself or herself is a participant of the event? In the above we understood that the agent himself or herself is a default choice for the locus of his or her point of view. From that it is expected that in the above case that the locus of the point of view is the agent himself or herself. Then let us propose the following default condition on the point of view.

(23)

> Given an event and an agent describing the event, when the agent is a participant of the event, the point of view of the agent is typically the agent himself or herself.

Given that in a linguistic utterance describing an event, the agent is the speaker, the above default constraint on the point of view would be rendered into a linguistic assumption, which we call the *Speaker Priority Default Principle*.

(24)

> *Speaker Priority Default Principle*: When the speaker describes an event/state involving himself or herself, the point of view of the description is the speaker himself or herself.

Point-of-view sensitive expressions: Grammatically, the above assumption predicts that when an expression referring to the speaker, e.g., *watasi* 'I' in Japanese appears in a sentence, the expression must occur at the grammatical position corresponding to the locus of the speaker's point of view. For example, in

the case of sentences whose main predicate is *iku* 'go', the grammatical position is the subject, corresponding to the source of the movement, while in the case of *kuru* 'come', the grammatical position is the locative phrase, corresponding to the goal of the movement. The prediction is perfectly borne out as you see in the contrast of grammaticality among the following sentences.

(25)

a. Watasi ga Taroo no tokoro ni itta[4].
I NOM Taroo of place LOC went
'I went to Taroo.'

b. ??Taroo ga watasi no tokoro ni itta.
Taroo NOM I of place LOC went
'Taroo went to me.'

c. Taroo ga watasi no tokoro ni kita[5].
Taroo NOM I of place LOC came
'Taroo came to me.'

d. ??Watasi ga Taroo no tokoro ni kita.
I NOM Taroo of place LOC came
'I came to Taroo.'

What is common to the ??-marked sentences, i.e., (25b) and (25d) is that the speaker pronoun *watasi* appears at a non-point of view grammatical position; the locative position in (25b), and the subject position in (25d); hence, a conflict in terms of the locus of point of view.

Let us introduce another set of point-of-view sensitive verbs, *yaru* and *kureru*, both of which basically mean 'give.' That is why they are called *giving verbs*. For example, they are used as in the following sentences.

(26) Taroo wa/ga Hanako ni purezento wo yaru.
Taroo TOP/NOM Hanako DAT present ACC give
'Taroo gives a present to Hanako.'

(27) Taroo wa/ga Hanako ni purezento wo kureru.
Taroo TOP/NOM Hanako DAT present ACC give
'Taroo gives a present to Hanako.'

Both of the sentences, (26) and (27) mean 'Taroo gives a present to Hanako.' But they are different in terms of the locus of the speaker's point of view; in (26), the speaker seems to describe the event, taking Taroo as his or her point of view,

while in (27), the event seems to be described with Hanako as the speaker's point of view. In terms of lexical properties, that means that *yaru* requires the point of view to be on the subject NP, on the other hand *kureru* specifies the point of view to be on a non-subject NP, in this case, the dative NP.

The lexical specifications of the giving verbs with regard to point of view can be attested by the following kind of data comparable to the ones we saw above in relation to the movement verbs, *iku* and *kuru*.

(28)	a.	Watasi	wa/ga	Hanako	ni	purezento	wo	yaru.
		I	TOP/NOM	Hanako	DAT	present	ACC	give
		'I give a present to Hanako.'						
	b.	*Watasi	wa/ga	Hanako	ni	purezento	wo	kureru.
		I	TOP/NOM	Hanako	DAT	present	ACC	give
		'I give a present to Hanako.'						
(29)	a.	*Hanako	wa/ga	watasi	ni	purezento	wo	yaru.
		Hanako	TOP/NOM	me	DAT	present	ACC	give
		'Hanako gives a present to me.'						
	b.	Hanako	wa/ga	watasi	ni	purezento	wo	kureru.
		Hanako	TOP/NOM	me	DAT	present	ACC	give
		'Hanako gives a present to me.'						

The grammatical facts exhibited in (28) and (29) will follow as consequences from the above claimed lexical properties of *yaru* and *kureru*, and the Speaker Priority Default Principle. The ungrammaticality of the asterisked sentences, i.e., (28b) and (29a) is due to a conflict in terms of the specification of the syntactic locus of the speaker's point of view. In (28b) *kureru* requires the dative NP, *Hanako*, to be the point of view, while the Speaker Priority Default Principle requires the subject NP, *watasi*, to be the point of view. In (29a) *yaru* imposes the selection of the subject NP, *Hanako*, as the speaker's point of view, but the Speaker Priority Default Principle demands the dative NP, *watasi*, to be the point of view.

We have seen that *yaru* and *kureru* are point-of-view sensitive main verbs. In addition to being used as main verbs, those words can be used as auxiliary verbs. For example, the auxiliary verbs, *-yaru* and *-kureru* are used as in the following sentences.

(30)

a. Taroo wa/ga Hanako ni gitaa wo hiite-yaru.
Taroo TOP/NOM Hanako DAT guitar ACC play
'Taroo plays the guitar for Hanako.'

b. Taroo wa/ga Hanako ni gitaa wo hiite-kureru.
Taroo TOP/NOM Hanako DAT guitar ACC play
'Taroo plays the guitar for Hanako.'

Combined with a main verb, both-*yaru* and *-kureru* have the same connotation that the act described by the main verb is beneficial to the referent of the dative NP. However, they are different with respect to the point-of-view conditions they impose; actually, the point-of-view conditions imposed by the auxiliary verbs, *-yaru* and *-kureru* are exactly the same as those for the main verbs, *yaru* and *kureru*, respectively. That is, *-yaru* demands the subject NP to represent the speaker's point of view, while *-kureru* opts for a non-subject NP, which is supported by the following grammaticality facts involving *-yaru* and *-kureru* , (31) and (32) in exactly the same way as (28) and (29) vindicated the point-of-view conditions on the use of them as main verbs.

(31)

a. Watasi wa/ga Hanako ni gitaa wo hiite-yaru.
I TOP/NOM Hanako DAT guitar ACC play
'I play the guitar for Hanako.'

b. *Watasi wa/ga Hanako ni gitaa wo hiite-kureru.
I TOP/NOM Hanako DAT guitar ACC play
'I plays the guitar for Hanako.'

(32)

a. *Hanako wa/ga watasi ni gitaa wo hiite-yaru.
Hanako TOP/NOM me DAT guitar ACC play
'Hanako plays the guitar for me.'

b. Hanako wa/ga watasi ni gitaa wo hiite-kureru.
Hanako TOP/NOM me DAT guitar ACC play
'Hanako plays the guitar for me.'

Default Syntactic Position for the Point of View We have observed that some expressions lexically specify which syntactic position will be associated with the

locus of the speaker's point of view. Next, I want to raise the following question: Is there any default syntactic position for the speaker's point of view? From the above discussion noting that we as finite cognitive agents can describe the world only from some view point, it is reasonable to expect that a sentence which is a linguistic expression of an agent's description of the world has a default syntactic position corresponding to the agent's point of view. I propose that the subject position is such a default position for the expression representing the point of view. Let us introduce the discourse principle *Subject Priority Default Principle*.

(33) *Subject Priority Default Principle*

In a sentence describing an event or state, the default syntactic position corresponding to the speaker's point of view is the subject place unless otherwise specified by a point-of-view sensitive expression.

For evidence for the discourse principle, I will present the following data:

(34)

a.	Kinoo	watasi	ga	Hanako	ni	koe	wo	kake-ta.
	yesterday	I	NOM	Hanako	to	voice	ACC	cast-PAST
	'I talked to Hanako yesterday.'							

b.	??Kinoo	Hanako	ga	watasi	ni	koe	wo	kakerare-ta.
	yesterday	Hanako	NOM	I	by	voice	ACC	be cast-PAST
	'Hanako was talked to by me yesterday.'							

If we assume the Subject Priority Default Principle, the ungrammaticality of (34b) will be a natural consequence from that with the Speaker Priority Default Principle, (24). That is, in (34b) there is a conflict with respect to the specification of the grammatical position for the point of view; the Speaker Default Principle requires a non-subject NP, *watasi ni* 'by me' is the position, while the Subject Priority Default Principle suggests that the subject NP, *Hanako ga* is such a position. Here, someone might suggest that the ungrammaticality of (34b) is somehow due to the passivization, having nothing to do with the considerations about point of view. The suspicion is ruled out in light of the following examples.

(35)

a.	Kinoo	Taroo	ga	Hanako	ni	koe	wo	kake-ta.
	yesterday	Taroo	NOM	Hanako	to	voice	ACC	cast-PAST
	'Taroo talked to Hanako yesterday.'							

b. Kinoo Hanako ga Taroo ni koe wo kakerare-ta.
yesterday Hanako NOM Taroo by voice ACC be cast-PAST

'Hanako was talked to by Taroo yesterday.'

If the suspicion were the case, (35b) should be as ungrammatical as (34b); however, the fact is that (35b) is as grammatical as (35a), and (34a) for that matter.

It should be clear that the above grammaticality facts are fairly sufficient evidence for the claim that the subject is the default grammatical place for point-of-view bearing NPs. Nevertheless, we will further motivate the claim by making sure that it is the subject NP, not the direct object NP or the oblique NP whose reference the speaker adopts as his or her point of view by default.

First, consider the following pair of examples.

(36) a. ?Kinoo kissaten de Hanako ga watasi wo
yesterday coffee shop at Hanako NOM I ACC

Taroo ni syookaisi-ta.
Taroo DAT introduce-PAST

'Hanako introduced me to Taroo at a coffee shop yesterday.'

b. Kinoo kissaten de Hanako ga watasi wo
yesterday coffee shop at Hanako NOM I ACC

Taroo ni syookaisite-kure-ta.
Taroo DAT introduce-KURERU-PAST

'Hanako introduced me to Taroo at a coffee shop yesterday.'

If the Subject Priority Default Principle is valid, (36a) should sound as bad as (34b). The fact of the matter is that as the number of question marks indicates, it does not sound so bad. At first sight, the fact seems to undermine the validity of the principle in question. However, it is still the case that (36a) does not sound perfectly natural. Furthermore, the contrast between (36a) and (36b) in grammaticality tells us that the direct object is not the default place for an NP bearing the speaker's point of view to be realized at, in the following sense. Remember that the auxiliary verb '-kureru' requires a non-subject NP to denote the speaker's point of view. The fact that *watasi* 'I', which represents the speaker's point of view by the Speaker Priority Default Principle, sits perfectly comfortably at the direct object place when the place is lexically designated for the speaker's point of view, i.e., in (36b), but not so comfortably otherwise, i.e., in (36a), strongly suggests that the direct object NP is not the default grammatical position for the speaker's point of view.

Next, we can give evidence that the oblique object is not the default point-of-view grammatical position, by the following data in exactly the analogous reasoning as in the case of the direct object.

(37) a. ?Kinoo kissaten de Hanako ga Taroo wo
yesterday coffee shop at Hanako NOM Taroo ACC

watasi ni syookaisi-ta.
me DAT introduce-PAST

'Hanako introduced Taroo to me at a coffee shop yesterday.'

b. Kinoo kissaten de Hanako ga Taroo wo
yesterday coffee shop at Hanako NOM Taroo ACC

watasi ni syookaisite-kure-ta.
me DAT introduce-KURERU-PAST

'Hanako introduced me to Taroo at a coffee shop yesterday.'

Later in the discussion of the *zibun*-binding, we will see that the Subject Priority Default Principle is the source for the subjecthood condition for the antecedent of the clause-bounded cases of the *zibun*-binding.

Additional justification for the subject priority default principle: "symmetric" predicates: By the above discussion, it has been established that it is, in fact, the subject, not the direct object or the oblique object that is the default grammatical locus for point-of-view bearing NPs. Yet we have not ruled out the possibility that the selection of the default position is also influenced by thematic roles of arguments as well as their grammatical functions. In the following we will argue that the syntactic locus of point of view is entirely determined by the grammatical functions of arguments, free from the influence of their thematic roles. The following data make a crucial use of data involving what we call "symmetric" predicates.

Relations like that of "looking like" are symmetric in the sense that for any two objects, *a* and *b*, if *a* looks like *b*, then *b* looks like *a*. It is interesting to see whether natural-language expressions corresponding to those relations are also "symmetric" in the sense that for any two NPs, "X" and "Y", and a predicate in question, "P", if "XPY" can be truthfully uttered, "YPX" can be uttered, too.

Let us consider sentences of the form, "X looks like Y" and "Y looks like X". Now replace "X" with the name of someone close to you, and Y with the name of someone known to you, but not close to you, e.g., a celebrity. My contention is that uttered out of context or unless "Y" is the topic of discourse, "X looks like Y" sounds natural, while "Y looks like X" sounds rather awkward; that is, "X looks like Y" and "Y looks like X" are not uttered equivalently in terms of felicity. Thus we can conclude that the natural-language predicates corresponding to the

symmetric relations are not necessarily symmetric. Exactly the same situation is applicable to Japanese. For example, let us consider the following pair of Japanese sentences.

(38) Yabushita-san wa/ga kootaisi ni nite-iru
-Mr./Ms. TOP/NOM prince DAT look like
'Mr. Yabushita looks like the prince.'

(39) #Kootaisi wa/ga Yabushita-san ni nite-iru
prince TOP/NOM -Mr./Ms. DAT look like
'The prince looks like Mr. Yabushita.'

In fact, I have sometimes been said to look like the current Japanese prince, Naruhito, and the sentence form with which they would use to describe the fact is more likely that of (38) than (39); (38) is more natural or felicitously uttered than (39). (However, the felicitous fact is not a hard and fast property of the pair of sentences; that is, the felicity property of (38) and (39) can be changed depending on contexts.)

How should the above felicity fact, which seems to be invariant between English and Japanese, be construed? We can account for the fact by means of the subject priority default principle and a reasonable assumption on point of view/empathy. The assumption can be phrased like this.

(40)

> Among people, the speaker takes the point of view of someone closer to him/her more readily than that of someone less close to him/her.

In fact, the speaker priority default principle is a special case of the above assumption, for the speaker himself/herself is the closest to the speaker. From the assumption (40) and the subject priority default principle, the difference between (38) and (39) in felicity falls out as a consequence in the following sense: With the subject being a default position for the speaker's point of view, in (39) there is a conflict with the assumption (40) in that *kootaisi* 'prince', which is less likely to be chosen as the speaker's point of view than *Yabushita-san*, occupies the subject position, while there is no such conflict in (38).

What can "symmetric" predicates tell us about the Subject Priority Default Principle? First let us review some facts about (non-)symmetric relations. The participants in non-symmetric relations play distinct thematic-roles; for instance, the two participants in a killing relation are a killer and a killee, and the use of the corresponding (active-voice) predicate *kill* specifies the killer to be realized in subject position, and the killee in object position. The specification is absolute in the sense that a failure to observe it results in an incorrect, or untruthful description of an event. That is, it does not hold in general that if 'A killed B' is true, then 'B killed A', and vice versa. On the other hand, in the case of symmetric relation

there is no distinction among the participants in terms of thematic roles; for example, the two participants in a meeting event play non-distinct thematic roles, i.e. a meeter, and at the same time, a meetee. Thus, it holds in general that if *a* meets *b*, then *b* meets *a*, and vice versa. Consequently, there should be no requirement as to which participant should be put in subject position and which participant, in object position in sentences whose main predicate is 'meet', at least in terms of truth conditions. That suggests that in describing events by means of "symmetric" predicates, one can choose either of the NPs for the subject place. However, as we have seen above, that is not the case in general; that is, the felicity of the choice for the subject is not equal for the NPs involved. We have seen that the choice of the NPs for the subject position for the "symmetric" predicates like 'look alike' and 'meet' is consistent with the Subject Priority Default Principle and other reasonable conditions on point of view. Since "symmetric" predicates can not lexically specify the assignment of the NPs to the grammatical functions in terms of the thematic roles of the NPs, for there is no distinction among the NPs in terms of thematic roles, the positioning of the NPs to the grammatical functions of the "symmetric" predicates are largely subject to conditions pertinent to point of view. To the extent that the felicity facts regarding to the selection of the NPs for the subject position, illustrated by examples from (34) to(39), the Subject Priority Default Principle is justified.

To the extent that the grammaticality facts exhibited by the sentences in the above discussion can be accounted for by perspectivity considerations, we can say that perspectivity indeed is significant for natural language grammars. Henceforth, I will sometimes use a term *indexical perspective* for point of view in the context of describing eventualities, following Katagiri (1991). For the notion in question, Kuno (1987) adopted a term *empathy*, and Iida & Sells (1988) and Sells (1987) used PIVOT.

Mental-state Descriptions In the above we have examined the perspectivity of recognition of the world, where the objects of recognition are eventualities, i.e., states and events. In our daily cognitive activities we are not just recognizing the physical states of affairs holding of the outside world. We are also recognizing mental states, or belief states, whether they are of our own or of other people. Otherwise we cannot act purposely, guess how other people behave, or infer how other people will infer. We will see that perspectivity is an indispensable element in the recognition of mental states, too.

Let me introduce a French boy, Pierre, who was originally introduced by Kripke (1979). Pierre grows up in France, and hears that a city he knows as "Londres" is beautiful. But for some reason he later finds himself in a filthy block of the city of London, and learns that the city he is in now is called "London." Is it plausible to characterize Pierre's belief state by the following statement?

(41) Londres is beautiful and London is ugly.

We, or strictly speaking, people who know that *Londres* and *London* are one and the same city feel ambivalent about characterizing Pierre's mental state by the statement or proposition. We feel uncomfortable when we interpret the statement based on our knowledge about the identity of *Londres* and *London*. In that case,

we know that the statement is contradictory; thus, ascribing the resulting propositional content to Pierre would end up characterizing his mental state as inconsistent although we do not think he is conceptually confused. While when we interpret the statement (41) based on Pierre's ignorance of the identity of *Londres* and *London*, then the characterization of Pierre's mental state by the proposition is agreeable to us.

What is to be noted from the above story is that when you characterize an agent's mental state with a proposition, you have to know with respect to whom the proposition is interpreted; in other words, the propositional content of a statement with which an agent's mental state is characterized cannot be determined until we know with respect to whose cognitive state the statement is evaluated.[6] I would argue that the one with respect to whom the statement characterizing an agent's mental state is evaluated is nothing but a realization of the notion of point of view in the context of mental state characterization. Henceforth, I will sometimes use a term *inferential perspective* for point of view in the context of mental state descriptions, following Katagiri (1991).

Linguistically, mental state descriptions are characteristically rendered into the form of sentences having a clausal complement or other proposition-denoting expression, as in (42).

(42)

a. Mary believes that Elvis Presley is still alive.

b. That his house was destroyed by the earthquake drove John into despair.

c. Martha claimed that she had won a lottery.

d. Dale got excited by the thought of going to London .

The above characterization of sentences describing mental states should remind you of the "logophoric" constructions. That is, both constructions are coextensional, as they should be because both of them are characterized by the presence of constructions characterizing mental states such as speeches, thoughts, feelings, and so on.

In the above discussion of Pierre's belief report, we recognized that given a mental state and a propositional expression to characterize the mental state, the characterization will not be determined without the specification of the one against whose cognitive state the propositional expression is interpreted to determine the propositional content, i.e., the point of view, or the inferential perspective. Then, the natural question is: Where is the locus of the inferential perspective in describing mental states; in other words, given a mental state, and a propositional representation to characterize the mental state with, against whose cognitive state

does an agent interpret the representation to determine its propositional content? It seems that the one whose mental state is characterized is an obvious choice. Linguistically, it is the speaker or experiencer of the direct discourse representation corresponding to the indirect discourse complement clause in the sense of Kuno's direct discourse perspective. The speaker and the experiencer are such that they are assigned a [+ log] feature and [+ logo-1] in Kameyama's logophoric system and Kuno's, respectively. Thus, it turned out that the "logophoric" NPs in general indicates the locus of the inferential perspective.

Zibun as a Point-of-view Sensitive Expression

We have examined the notion of point of view in recognizing the world, more specifically, describing events and states not involving mental states on the one hand, and describing mental states on the other hand, and argued that the point of view in the non-mental-state descriptions, i.e., the indexical perspective is related to the subject position of the corresponding sentences, and the one in the mental-state descriptions is related to what have been called the "logophoric" NPs in the linguistic literature.

With the above background, I propose a theory of *zibun*-binding:

(43)

> The referent of *zibun* is to be identified with the locus of the point of view of the description in which the *zibun* appears.

More specifically, when *zibun* appears in a sentence which is not a clausal complement argument, its referent is identified with the point of view for the event/state description, i.e., the indexical perspective, and when it occurs in a clausal complement argument, its referent is identified with the "speaker" or experiencer of the mental state characterized by the clausal complement.

Let us illustrate our current theory by examining an example that embodies both of the subtypes of *zibun* being bound by point of view, i.e., (2), which is reproduced here.

(2) Hanako$_i$ wa [Taroo$_j$ ga zibun$_{i/j}$ wo aisiteiru] to omotteiru
Hanako TOP Taroo NOM self ACC love COMP think
'Hanako$_i$ thinks that Taro$_j$ loves her$_i$/himself$_j$.'

The binding relation represented by *Taroo$_j$* and *zibun$_j$* is a case of the indexical-perspective binding; that is, the referent of *zibun* is identified with that of the indexical perspective, which is specified as the referent of the subject phrase, *Taroo ga* by the Subject Priority Default Principle. Next, the binding relation expressed by *Hanako$_i$* and *zibun$_i$* is a case of the inferential perspective binding, identifying the referent of *zibun* with that of the point of view with respect to an indirect discourse complement clause, in this case, *[Taroo ga zibun wo aisiteiru]*, where *Hanako ga* is the "logophoric" NP.

Although we will not analyze the zibun-bindings of any other examples in this section, it should be easy to characterize all the instances of *zibun*-binding encountered so far into one of the subclasses of point-of-view bound *zibun*.

Hypothetical Alternative Analyses In the preceding section, I proposed a conceptually very simple "unified" hypothesis of the binding of the Japanese reflexive *zibun*; that is, the reference of *zibun* is to be identified with that of a point of view. Of the instances of *zibun*-binding, the cases of clause-bounded subject binding are now categorized as a subclass of point of view binding, where the point of view is an indexical perspective, and the cases of the so-called "logophoric" binding are now the other subclass of point of view binding, where the point of view is an inferential perspective. Since the instances of point of view binding are comprised by the two subclasses of subject binding and "logophoric" binding, it is reasonable for someone to ask the following question: How is the current "unified" point-of-view based theory different from the following kind of hypothetical alternative analyses?

(44)

> *Zibun* is to be bound by a subject NP or a "logophoric" NP.

(45)

> *Zibun* is to be bound by a subject NP or a point of view, with the proviso that one subtype of point of view, i.e., indexical perspective tends to be expressed as a subject.

In fact, the data examined so far do not actually favor our theory over the above alternatives.[7] That is, in terms of descriptive adequacy we have not demonstrated that our unified hypothesis is superior to the above non-unified hypotheses. What is common to the above alternatives, (44) and (45) is that they both take the subjecthood of an NP as a sufficient condition for the NP to be an antecedent for *zibun*, while our theory does not make such a claim. According to our theory, the essential property of a binder of *zibun* is being an point of view, and the subjecthood of some antecedent NPs of *zibun* is a derivative property due to the principle that a point of view tends to be realized as a subject (Subject Priority Default Principle). Hence our theory predicts that given an instance of *zibun* in a sentence, if the subject NP does not denote a point of view, but a non-subject NP does, that is, the Subject Priority Default Principle is overridden, the *zibun* legitimately can be bound only by the non-subject NP. On the other hand, the hypothetical alternative analyses predict that the *zibun* legitimately would be bound by the subject NP as well. In the following we will see some evidence that favors our theory over the hypothetical alternatives.

Remember that we have seen in Section 4.1.1 that there are some expressions that specify the locus of a point of view, e.g. motion verbs like *iku* 'go' and *kuru* 'come', and auxiliary verbs like *-kureru*, *-yaru*, *-ageru*; *-kureru*, for instance, specifies the locus of a point of view to be a non-subject. With the background in mind, let us consider the following example.

(46) Taroo$_i$ wa/ga Ziroo$_j$ ni zibun*$_{i/j}$ sen'yo no heya o
Taroo TOP/NOM Ziroo DAT self exclusive use GEN room ACC

itizi kasite-kureta[8].
temporarily lend-KURERU-PAST

'Taroo$_i$ lent Ziroo$_j$ a room for his*$_{i/j}$ exclusive use temporarily.'

As is indicated by the indexation in (46), the available reading is the one where *zibun* is bound by the object NP, *Ziroo* instead of the subject NP, *Taroo*. That is, the exclusivity of the use of the room in question is applicable only to Ziroo; in other words, the sentence can be true even if the room in question had been used by other people than Taroo before it was lent to Ziroo as long as it was used only by Ziroo after the lease. The binding fact of *zibun* in (46) renders evidence against the hypothetical alternatives. For according to the alternatives, the subjecthood of an NP should be sufficient for the NP to be a binder of *zibun*; hence, (46) would be wrongly predicted to have the *-marked unavailable reading. On the other hand, the binding fact is consistent with our hypothesis, which basically states that *zibun* is to be bound by a point of view, which, in the case of (46), is realized as the object NP, *Ziroo*.

The unavailability or near unavailability of the reading corresponding to *zibun* being bound by the subject NP, *Taroo* in (46) is highlighted by the following example (47), which is only different from (46) in that the predicate takes an auxiliary verb '*-yaru*' instead of '*-kureru*'; -yaru, if you recall, lexically specifies that the speaker's point of view should be on (the referent of) the subject NP.

(47) Taroo$_i$ wa/ga Ziroo$_j$ ni zibun$_{i/}$*$_j$ sen'yo no heya o
Taroo TOP/NOM Ziroo DAT self exclusive use GEN room ACC

itizi kasite-yatta[9].
temporarily lend-YARU-PAST

'Taroo$_i$ lent Ziroo$_j$ a room for his$_{/}$*$_j$ exclusive use temporarily.'

In contrast to the case of (46), the preferred or dominant reading of (47) is the one corresponding to *zibun* being bound by the subject NP, *Taroo* instead of the object NP, *Ziroo*; that is, the exclusivity of the room in question is regarding to Taroo, this time; in other words, the sentence can be true even if the room was used by people other than Ziroo as long as it had been used exclusively by Taroo before the lease.

Let us see further set of examples that vindicates the point we have attested in the above examples.

(48) a. *Taroo$_i$ wa/ga zibun$_i$ no musuko ni purezento wo
Taroo TOP/NOM self GEN son DAT present ACC

katte-kure-ta
buy-KURERU-PAST
'Taroo$_i$ bought his$_i$ son a present.'

b. Taroo$_i$ wa/ga zibun$_i$ no musuko ni purezento wo
Taroo TOP/NOM self GEN son DAT present ACC

katte-yat-ta
buy-YARU-PAST
'Taroo$_i$ bought his$_i$ son a present.'

As in (46) and (47), (48a) and (48b) are minimally different from each other with respect to their auxiliary verbs; (48a) has '-kureru', while (48b) has '-yaru'.

With (48a), as the asterisk indicates, there is no reading corresponding to the co-indexing exhibited there, i.e., the reading where *zibun* is bound by the subject NP, *Taroo*, which the hypothetical alternative analyses wrongly predict would be available. For that matter, there are no other readings with respect to the binding of *zibun* available, either. The situation with (48a) is quite consistent with our point-of-view based theory of *zibun*-binding in the following sense. From the fact that the auxiliary verb '-kureru' specifies (the referent of) a non-subject NP, in this case, *zibun no musuko* 'self's son' to be a point of view, and our theory of *zibun*-binding that *zibun* is to be bound by a point of view, it follows that *zibun* should be bound by *zibun no musuko*. However, the specification of the value of *zibun* is circular, for *zibun* is characterized by another expression containing *zibun* itself. Thus, the value of *zibun* will be left indeterminate, which presumably accounts for the ungrammaticality of (48a). On the other hand, in (48b) the auxiliary verb '-yaru' specifies the subject NP, in this case, *Taroo*, to be a point of view. Then, our theory of *zibun*-binding predicts that *zibun* is to be bound by the subject NP, *Taroo*, which corresponds to the available reading of (48b).

Note that the binding relation between *Taroo$_i$* and *zibun$_i$* in (48b) depends on *Taroo*'s being a point of view, not *Taroo*'s being a subject NP, for otherwise the binding relation between *Taroo* and *zibun* should be possible in (48a) as well, which is not the case. That casts a serious doubt on the validity of the hypothetical alternative analyses of *zibun*-binding, or generally any analysis that holds that the subjecthood of an NP is a sufficient condition for the NP to be an antecedent of *zibun*.

The Non-syntactic Nature of *Zibun*-binding The most important thesis of our theory of *zibun*-binding expounded in the current paper is that the only requirement that *zibun* imposes on its antecedent is just its referent should denote a point of view. That is, there is no requirement in terms of syntactic structural properties

whatsoever. In the following we will see some evidence that confirms the non-syntactic nature of *zibun*-binding.

Humanness condition for reflexivization: Kuno (1987) observed that there is a hierarchy among NPs with respect to the availability as an antecedent for a picture-noun reflexive. First, consider the following examples from Kuno (1987).

(49) a. Ironically, Mary$_i$ owed her$_i$ success partly to that scandalous rumor about herself$_i$ that was going around.

b. *Ironically, the book$_i$ owed its$_i$ success partly to that scandalous rumor about itself$_i$ that was going around.

(50) a. ?They wrapped Mary$_i$ with an enlarged portrait of herself$_i$.

b. *They wrapped the diamond$_i$ with an enlarged picture of itself$_i$.

(51) a. Fido$_i$ owed his$_i$ enormous popularity in the neighborhood to newspaper articles about himself$_i$.

b. ??The dog$_i$ owed his$_i$ enormous popularity in the neighborhood to newspaper articles about himself$_i$.

From the above grammaticality data it seems reasonable to propose the following hierarchy among NPs as to reflexivization in terms of humanness.

(52)

Humanness Hierarchy: The higher the triggering NP is in the humanness hierarchy, the better the result of reflexivization is.

Human > Nonhuman animate > Inanimate

However, the English reflexive, specifically, as a picture-noun reflexive seems to be exempted from the humanness condition as long as the antecedent is a subject NP, as you see in the following.

(53) a. The book has overextended itself in its coverage.

b. Harvard has published a book about itself.

c. The cell has produced a clone of itself.

(54) The wire was touching itself.[10]

Next, let us consider the following Japanese examples of reflexivization comparable to the above English data.

(55) a. Hanako$_i$ wa/ga zibun$_i$ nikansuru uwasa wo
Hanako TOP/NOM self concerning rumor ACC

tanosin-de-iru
enjoying
'Hanako$_i$ is enjoying a rumor concerning herself$_i$.

b. Tama$_i$[11] wa/ga zibun$_i$ no sippo wo oikake-te-iru.
Tama TOP/NOM self GEN tail ACC chasing
'Tama is chasing his/her tail.'

c. ?Sono neko$_i$ wa/ga zibun$_i$ no sippo wo oikake-te-iru.
that cat TOP/NOM self GEN tail ACC chasing
'The cat is chasing its tail.'

d. *Sono kaisya$_i$ wa/ga zibun$_i$ no okyaku wo
that company TOP/NOM self GEN customers ACC

saiyusen site keieisa-re-te-iru.
top priority making being run
'The company is being run with its customers being its top priority.'

There is a close parallelism between the English (picture-noun) reflexive and the Japanese reflexive, *zibun* with respect to the humanness condition, as you see in the above sentences. However, the parallelism is not exact in that as is shown by (55d), the subjecthood of an NP is not a sufficient condition for the NP to be a binder of the reflexive in question in Japanese, unlike English.

The grammaticality facts of the above English and Japanese reflexives are significant in two respects. First, the English reflexive, X-*self/selves* is sometimes subject to semantic and pragmatic conditions for its antecedent as well as structural syntactic conditions, which have been often claimed to be the sole factors for the English reflexivization. Second, the conditions for Japanese reflexivization seem to

be essentially semantic and pragmatic, for the subjecthood alone of an NP does not authorize reflexivization as it does in English. The second point strongly points to the thesis of our theory of the *zibun*-binding; that is, the binding condition of *zibun* is semantically and pragmatically characterized such that the referent of *zibun* is to be identified with the speaker's point of view.

Antecedent-less *Zibun*-binding: Before concluding this section, let us see other evidence for the non-syntactic nature of the *zibun*-binding. The following argument involves cases where the antecedent of *zibun* is not syntactically present in the sentences.

Consider the following example.

(56) Zibun wa/ga Tookyoo kara kimasi-ta.
self TOP/NOM Tokyo from come-PAST
'I came from Tokyo.'

There is no antecedent NP present for *zibun* in (56); however, as you can tell from the gloss, the binder of *zibun* is the speaker; usually, when *zibun* appears in a matrix declarative sentence without a possible antecedent NP in the sentence, the referent of the *zibun* is the speaker. That type of example is problematic to any analysis that tries to characterize the binder of *zibun* on purely syntactic grounds such as grammatical functions, for simply the binder of *zibun* in those cases is not manifested syntactically.

Someone might respond by saying that the above sentence, (56) is to be derived from the following kind of underlying structure *a la* Ross' (1970) performative-verb hypothesis.

(57) I SAY TO YOU [zibun wa/ga Tookyoo kara kimasi-ta]
self TOP/NOM Tokyo from come-PAST

In (57), ' I ' is the binder of *zibun*, which is just another case of subject-bound reflexive; therefore, (56) is not a counterexample to the subjecthood condition for the antecedent of *zibun*.

However, consider another example where there is no syntactic expression as an antecedent for *zibun*.

(58) Zibun wa doko kara kimasi-ta ka.
self TOP where from came-PAST Q
'Where did you come from?'

This time, as the gloss tells, *zibun* is coreferent with the hearer, instead of the speaker. The defender of the syntactic-based characterization of the *zibun*-binder would suggest that (58) is to be derived from the following kind of underlying structure.

(59) I ASK (OF) YOU [zibun wa doko kara kimasi-ta ka]
self TOP where from came-PAST Q

In (59), *zibun* is bound by the (oblique) object NP, '(OF) YOU'; thus, the proponent of the syntactically based characterization of the *zibun*-binder would be led to propose that an NP can bind *zibun* if it is an (oblique) object NP. But one does not want to tread down the path, for combined with the subjecthood sufficient condition for the *zibun*-binder, the (oblique) objecthood sufficient condition for the *zibun*-binder means "Anything goes."; that is, *zibun* can be bound by an NP of any grammatical function.

On the contrary, the current point of view-based approach can offer a coherent account for the above cases. When a person utters a statement with a matrix sentence, it seems reasonable to assume that the speaker is aware of the fact that he or she is making the statement; that is, he or she has some attitude to the propositional content corresponding to the sentence. In other words, a matrix sentence *de facto* can function as a "logophoric" complement clause. In this context, the speaker is nothing but a "logophoric" NP, a [+logo-1] NP in Kuno's terms, or an inferential perspective of a mental state characterized by the complement clause. Hence, in our current analysis (56) is just another case of *zibun* being bound by a point of view, specifically, an inferential perspective.

What about (58)? The binder of *zibun* is not the speaker, but the hearer. Note the fact that (58) is an interrogative sentence, not a declarative sentence as (56). In asking a question with a interrogative sentence, it is the hearer's information state, not the speaker's that the interrogative sentence is, in a sense, matched against to solicit a response; in our terms, it is the hearer's mental state with respect to which the propositonal content expressed by the interrogative sentence is evaluated. That is, the default inferential perspective of the propositional content expressed by an interrogative sentence is the hearer. Therefore, (58) also can be seen as just another case of *zibun* being bound by a point of view.[12]

Conclusion

In this paper we proposed a unified theory of *zibun*-binding; for any instance of *zibun*, its referent is to be identified with that of a point of view. There are two manifestations of the point of view, depending on what kind of description for which the point of view is meant. If it is for a description of an event/state not involving a mental state, the point of view is an indexical perspective, and if the description is about a mental state, the point of view is an inferential perspective. The two subclasses of *zibun*-binding, i.e., the indexical-perspective binding and the inferential-perspective binding correspond to what have been traditionally considered two distinct uses of *zibun*, i.e., the clause-bounded subject-bound reflexive, and the "logophoric" pronoun.

NOTES

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1 For Kuno, the corresponding direct discourse representation is not just inferentially arrived from an indirect discourse complement clause, but literally exists to the extent that he proposed that (b) should be derived from the following underlying structure:

[Ali claimed ["I am the best boxer in the world."]].

2 *iku* 'go' + *ta* 'PAST' á *itta*

3 *kuru* 'come' + *ta* 'PAST' á *kita*

4 *iku* 'go' + *ta* 'PAST' á *itta*

5 *kuru* 'come' + *ta* 'PAST' á *kita*

6 For a semantics of belief report incorporating what we call the point of view for mental-state descriptions, see, for example, Asher (1986).

7 I owe the point to Steve Wechsler.

8 kureru + ta 'PAST' á kureta

9 yaru + ta 'PAST' á yatta

10 I owe to Steve Wechsler this particular example, and suspecting the relevance of humanness, or "sentience" condition, to borrow his terminology, to the essentially semantic and pragmatic nature of the *zibun*-binder.

11 Tama is a representative name for a cat in Japan(ese).

12 Some Japanese native speakers do not accept the reading of (86) in which *zibun* is bound by the hearer. We can hypothesize that for those speakers, the hearer cannot be an inferential perspective for direct speech statements.

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